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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant/Appellant Shannon Ashcraft, hereby appeals to the Utah court of Appeals from 
the final criminal judgment and conviction rendered against him on December 23, 1996, by the 
Honorable LA. Dever, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in a for Tooele County, State of Utah, 
convicting him of two counts of Forgery, Third Degree Felony, and two counts of Theft, a Class 
B Misdemeanor and a Class C Misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction over 
Defendant/Appellant Ashcraft's appeal pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2)(a); Section 77-18a-
l(l)(a); and Utah Code Annotated Title 78-2a-3(2)(e), whereby an appeal from the court of 
record in a criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for 
anything other than a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 
Defendant/Appellant Ashcraft raises one primary issue for appeal: 
1 Whether defendant/Appellant, Shannon Ashcraft was denied 
due process of law and effective assistance of counsel when the 
court appointed Attorney Ronald Elton as his trial counsel. 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews a denial of due process of law and effective assistance of counsel 
under a abuse of discretion standard: State vs. Brown. 835 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
2 
Defendant/Appellant submits the following as representative of determinative law. 
a. State vs. Brown. 835 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). 
b. State vs. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. Nature of Case 
This is an appeal from a final judgment and conviction rendered on December 23, 1996 in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah, the Honorable L.A. 
Dever presiding, convicting Defendant/Appellant Ashcraft of Forgery, a Third Degree Felony, and 
Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court: 
On or about March 18, 1996, Defendant/Appellant Ashcraft appeared for a felony first 
appearance in the Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, State of Utah, before the 
Honorable L.A. Dever. The Court appointed public defender Ronald Elton to represent the 
Defendant/Appellant on the criminal charges filed against him. On or about April 15, 1997, 
Defendant/Appellant Ashcraft appeared with his Court appointed counsel, Ronald Elton. 
Defendant/Appellant Ashcraft entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. On or about June 11, 
1996, the case was tried before a jury and Defendant/Appellant Ashcraft was found guilty of two 
counts of Forgery, Third Degree Felonies, and two counts of Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor and a 
3 
Class C Misdemeanor. On September 30, 1996, Court appointed counsel, Ronald Elton filed a 
withdrawal of counsel. Judge LA. Dever subsequently appointed the law office of Parker, 
Freestone, Angerhofer & Harding to represent the Defendant/Appellant at sentencing. On 
December 23, 1996, Defendant/Appellant Ashcraft was sentenced to the Utah State Prison to 
serve a sentence of 0-5 years on counts 1 & 2, 6 months on count 3, and 90 days for Count 4. 
Said sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about March 18, 1996, defendant appeared for felony first appearance and Public 
Defender Ronald Elton was appointed to represent the defendant. 
On or about March 21, 1996, Mr. Elton entered his appearance of counsel and filed a 
Request For Discovery. 
Defendant/Appellant appeared for arraignment with his court appointed attorney, Ron 
Elton on April 15, 1996, and plead not guilty to the charges. On June 11, 1996, trial before a jury 
was held with Ron Elton representing the defendant/appellant. Defendant/Appellant was found 
guilty on all four counts. 
At the time Attorney Ron Elton represented the Defendant/Appellant during his trial in the 
Third District Court, Tooele County, Mr. Elton was also the City Attorney for the cities of 
Grantsville, Stockton and Rush Valley, in Tooele County, State of Utah. Defendant/Appellant 
contends that Mr. Elton's employment as the city attorney for the above-mentioned cities while he 
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represented the defendant/appellant in a criminal prosecution was a conflict of interest, thus, 
defendant/appellant was represented by ineffective assistance of counsel. 
On or about September 30, 1996, Attorney Ron Elton, filed a withdrawal of counsel as 
defendant/appellant's attorney. 
On or about December 17, 1996, the law office of Parker, Freestone, Angerhofer & 
Harding was appointed by the court to represent the defendant/appellant at sentencing. 
On or about December 23, 1997, defendant/appellant was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison to the above-mentioned term. 
On or about May 13, 1997, defendant/appellant filed a Motion To Remand For 
Determination Of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
On or about June 20, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied defendant/appellant's Motion to 
Remand. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant/Appellant was represented by court appointed public defender, Ronald Elton, 
who, at the time he represented Defendant/Appellant, was the city attorney for the cities of 
Grantsville, Rush Valley and Stockton, Utah, cities which are located in Tooele County, the same 
county as Defendant/Appellant was prosecuted, tried and convicted. 
The Courts have concluded that as a matter of public policy and pursuant to inherent 
supervisory power over the courts, and the express power to practice law, that counsel with 
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concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons. 
Defendant/Appellant was indigent, and Elton was appointed to represent him. Elton's duties as a 
city attorney in Grantsville and his duties as a public defender in the same county created an 
inherent conflict of interest, constituting ineffective assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WAS COMPROMISED WHEN ELTON WAS 
APPOINTED AS PUBLIC DEFENDER TO REPRESENT ASHCRAFT FOR THE 
CRIMINAL CHARGES IN TOOELE COUNTY. 
Ashcraft claims that Elton's employment as a city attorney in Grantsville, while he was 
representing Ashcraft in the Third District Court, Tooele County, constituted a conflict of 
interest and a violation of Ashcraft's due process rights, and right to effective assistance of 
counsel. In State vs. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) the Court did not decide whether it was 
constitutionally impermissible to appoint a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities to 
represent an indigent defendant. However, the Court in Brown Id. did conclude that a vital 
interest of the criminal justice system are jeopardized when a city prosecutor is appointed to assist 
in the defense of an accused. The Court held that as a matter of public policy and pursuant to 
their inherent supervisory powers over the courts, as well as their express power that govern the 
practice of law, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend 
indigent persons. See State vs. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996). 
Brown cited Utah Criminal Code Ann. Sec 77-31-1(4), which requires that counties, 
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cities, and towns providing counsel for indigent defendants, " [a]ssure undivided loyalty of 
defense counsel to the client". The court set forth that the undivided loyalty is compromised 
when an attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities represents an indigent defendant. The court 
set forth examples such as: city police officers are often primary witnesses for the prosecution, 
and if those same police officers are called to testify in a case a city attorney is defending, the city 
attorney may be disinclined to vigorously and abrasively cross-examine these witnesses because 
such conduct might compromise cooperation in future prosecutions. Additionally, counsel may 
be reluctant to attack inappropriate conduct by the police. A conflict of interest would operate to 
deprive a criminal defendant of the undivided loyalty of defense counsel which he is entitled. 
Another case in which the defendant had been represented by a part-time city prosecutor is 
State vs. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350, (Utah 1996). The defendant was charged and convicted of a 
crime in 1983 in Brigham City. Defendant Gordon was indigent and the court appointed attorney 
Clinton S. Judkins, who was a part-time prosecutor for the city of Tremonton. Some nine years 
later, Defendant filed a motion for new trial contending that his constitutional right to an appeal 
was denied because Judkins had failed to pursue the appeal due to his conflict of interest as a city 
prosecutor. Consequently, the motion for new trial was denied and Defendant filed for post 
conviction relief Subsequently, the court ruled against Gordon due to the fact that the decision 
made in Brown was not retroactive. The courts decision in Brown announced for the first time 
that counsel with concurrent prosecutorial duties could not represent indigent defendants, a clear 
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change from past procedures. The court previously held that when a new rule governing criminal 
procedure constitutes a clear break with the past, it is not generally applied retroactively. 
However, the appointment of counsel in the present case occurred after the ruling in Brown. 
H. ATTORNEY RONALD ELTON WAS THE CITY ATTORNEY FOR 
GRANTSVILLE AND HAD PROSECUTORIAL DUTIES. 
Although Elton represented to the State that he advised the city only on civil matters, and 
the State claims that the City of Grantsville contracts with the Tooele City prosecutor for 
prosecutorial representation. (Footnote 1 in Objection to Rule 23B Remand Request Exhibit 1 ). 
Procedures in Grantsville appeal to be otherwise In a document entitled "Rules Of the Justice 
Court, Grantsville, Utah", page two, paragraph three, specifically states that, "...case will be 
prosecuted by the Grantsville City Attorney, Mr. Ronald Elton..." (See Exhibit 2). 
Furthermore, the city attorney in a small community such as Grantsville, holds a 
supervisory position over any attorney appearing before the court for civil and/or criminal 
matters. Mr. Elton would have input into which cases the city would prosecute and who would 
be the prosecutor on those cases, with himself having the authority to prosecute the cases. 
Mr. Elton as the Grantsville City Attorney has the authority to prosecute infractions and 
misdemeanors in the city where he is the city attorney. Pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 10-3-928: 
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney may prosecute 
violations of city ordinances, and under state law, infractions and 
misdemeanors occurring within the boundaries of the municipality 
and has the same powers in respect to the violations as are 
exercised by a county attorney or district attorney, including, but 
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not limited to, granting immunity to witnesses. The city attorney 
shall represent the interest of the state or the municipality in the 
appeal of any matter prosecuted in any trial court by the city 
attorney. See State vs. Robertson. 886 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1994). 
In Robertson Id. the defendant challenged the constitutionality and authority of the city 
attorney to prosecute cases without being an elected officials The court ruled that city attorneys 
are authorized to prosecute certain cases in the name of the State, relieving the duty, but not the 
authority, of the county and district attorneys and the attorney general to conduct the 
prosecutions. 
Defendant/Appellant claims that since Mr. Elton had the authority to prosecute cases as 
the city attorney and to supervise any other attorney acting as prosecutor, he would not have been 
diligent in representing the Defendant as a public defender. In order to represent a defendant in a 
criminal prosecution, defense counsel is usually challenging the constitutionality of the laws and 
circumstances surrounding the case against the defendant. For example: a defendant may be 
challenging the constitutionality of an illegal search and seizure. The defense attorney would 
attempt to discredit the search and seizure and state that it violated the defendant's rights. A city 
attorney may very well have a similar set of circumstances when prosecuting a case for the city 
wherein he attempts to say that the search and seizure was constitutional. The public defender 
may hesitate to attack the constitutionality of the very laws that they are sworn to uphold as 
prosecutors. 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 77-32-1, provides that each county, city, and town shall 
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provide for the defense of indigent person in criminal cases in the courts and various 
administrative bodies of the state in accordance with minimum standards". 77-32-1(4), (assure 
undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client). The county of Tooele has failed to provide the 
Defendant/Appellant with counsel with undivided loyalty. It would appear that Mr. Elton's 
loyalty would lie with the city attorney position in that he would not be diligent in pursuing and 
challenging the witnesses or evidence against the Defendant. Mr. Elton had the legal authority to 
prosecute pursuant to Utah code of Criminal Procedure 77-32-1, he in fact prosecuted as 
evidence by the Rules of the Justice Court of Grantsville, and he would have had supervisory 
authority over any other attorney that prosecuted on behalf of Grantsville. Further facts to 
support Defendant/Appellant's position that Mr. Elton had a concurrent prosecutorial role was 
sought by means of a Rule 23B remand motion but was denied by this court. Since neither 
Defendant/Appellant's trial counsel, nor the State, has a vested interest in freely and voluntarily 
providing additional information that would tend to establish the concurrent prosecutorial role of 
Mr Elton, Defendant/Appellant appeals to this court to conclude as a matter of public policy and 
pursuant to its inherent supervisory power over the courts to find ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
m. THE COURT TO REMAND A CASE WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL HAS DUAL 
OBLIGATIONS AS A CITY ATTORNEY AND DEFENSE ATTORNEY. 
Defendant/Appellant Ashcraft does not have to show that he was prejudiced by his 
representation from Mr Elton. The mere fact that Mr. Elton represented the Defendant/Appellant 
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in a criminal prosecution, while he was a city attorney in a city in the same county, is enough for 
the court to reverse the Defendant/Appellant's conviction. The court ruled in Brown. Id., that a 
concrete showing of prejudice would be very difficult to make when a prosecutor is appointed to 
assist in the defense of an accused. The court concluded that it was unnecessary and ill-advised to 
pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual prejudice. Instead, it announced a per se rule of 
reversal wherever such dual representation was undertaken so as to prevent its recurrence. 
As a result of Mr. Elton representing the Defendant/Appellant in a criminal prosecution 
while the city attorney, Defendant/Appellant's Sixth Amendment rights have been violated and 
reversal of his conviction is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that the court 
find that his rights were violated and he received ineffective assistance of counsel by his being 
represented in a criminal prosecution by Mr. Elton, while Mr. Elton was the city attorney for the 
city of Grantsville, Tooele County, State of Utah. 
DATED this &_ day of July, 1997. 
David J. $ngerhofe* l/[^s 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing BRIEF OF DEFEND ANT/APPELLANT 
SHANNON ASHCRAFT was delivered through the United States Postal Service to the 
following: 
James H Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Christine Soltis 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
DATED this'J]_ day of July, 1997 
oQj\ 
David J. Angerhcfrer 
Attorney ror Defendant/Appellant 
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EXHIBIT 1 
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
(801) 366-0180 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





OPPOSITION TO RULE 23B 
REMAND REQUEST 
Case No. 970069-CA 
Defendant requests a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, to determine whether his trial counsel, Ron Elton, was ineffective. The 
sole basis for this request is the defendant's belief that Mr. Elton was a city attorney for 
Grantsville at the time of the trial. Under State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 856-57 (Utah 
1992), defendant argues, trial counsel's city position barred him from serving as a legal 
defender. 
Defendant, however, reads too much into Brown, which bars only city attorneys 
with "prosecutorial functions" from serving as defense counsel. Brown, 853 P.2d at 
857. There, the Utah Supreme Court ruled, on the basis of its inherent supervisory 
powers, that "counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed 
to defend indigent persons." Id. Defendant fails to allege either in his affidavit or his 
memo that Mr. Elton had prosecutorial responsibilities.1 He claims only that trial 
counsel was a city attorney. 
Additionally, and fundamentally, defendant also misreads the scope of rule 23B. 
A remand under that rule is available only "for the purpose of entering findings of fact 
relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah R.App.P. 23B(a) (1997). 
The supreme court in Brown carefully avoided any language that would imply a 
constitutional, i.e., sixth amendment, basis to its ban on appointment of city 
prosecutors as defense counsel. Brown, 853 P.2d at 856. 
Indeed, the court emphasized that its decision was not constitutionally based. Id. 
On the other hand, the decision rested on public policy and the court's inherent 
supervisory power. The supreme court recently reaffirmed this non-constitutional 
reasoning in State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 354 (Utah 1996), over the strident dissent 
of Justices Stewart and Durham, who both claimed that the sixth amendment was the 
grounding for the ban. An allegation that defense counsel was a city prosecutor, even 
if true, does not establish a claim under ineffective assistance law, but merely under the 
1
 Mr. Elton has represented to the State that he advised the city only on civil matters. 
The City of Grantsville contracts with the Tooele City prosecutor for prosecutorial representation. Mr. 
Elton has no control over prosecution. Further, Mr. Elton does not, and never has, represented 
Stockton or Rush Valley, as defendant claims. 
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court's general powers to regulate the profession and the lower courts. This claim does 
not justify a rule 23B hearing, which is available only to ferret out facts regarding 
ineffective assistance.2 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's request for a rule 23B remand should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 2b— May 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
2 Defendant nowhere claims actual ineffective assistance under the Strickland doctrine. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
. May 1997,1 mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of this 
OPPOSITION TO RULE 23B REMAND REQUEST to: 
DAVID ANGERHOFER 
Parker, Freestone, Angerhofer & Harding 
Bank One Tower 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ALAN K. JEPPESON 
47 South Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
RONALD L. ELTON 
85 North Main Street 




RULES OF THE JUSTICE COURJL *4 </-?0-A 
URANTSVILLE CITY, UTAH 
As a result of a citation having been issued to you or as a result of 
your arrest, the above eutitLed court has jurisdiction over your case, 
and advises you of the fuLlowing procedures of the court and rights that 
you are entitled to: 
FIRST APPEAJRANCE: 
1. You have the right to be informed of the charge(s) brought 
against you and to be furnished a copy of said charge(s). 
2. You have the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed 
by the court without expense to you, if you are unable to obtain 
your own counsel. 
3. You have the right to be advised of bail or other circumstances 
under which you may obtain a pre-trial release. 
4. You have the right not to make any statement and any statements 
you do make may be used against you in a court of law. 
5. You have the right to have a reasonable time and opportunity to 
counsel before proceeding further, and if you desire to proceed 
without counsel, you must so state in open court. 
6. The Judge will ask you to enter a plea to the charge(s): 
(a). If you enter a guilty plea, you will be sentenced by the 
court, as provided by law. 
(b). If you enter a not guilty plea, a trial date shall be set 
and it may not be extended except for good cause shown. 
GUILTY PLEA: Before the court can accept a plea of guilty or no contest 
to the charge(s) the court must make the following findings: 
1. That if you are not represented by counsel, you have knowingly 
waived your right to counsel or do not desire to be represented. 
2. That the plea is voluntarily made. 
3. That you understand your right against compulsory self-incrimin-
ation, right to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine 
in open court the witnesses against you and that by entering the 
plea you waive all these rights. 
4. That you understand the nature and elements of the offense to 
which you are entering a plea; that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of providing each of those elements be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements. 
5. That you know the minimum and maximum sentence that may be im-
posed upon you for each offense to which a plea is entered, in-
cluding the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentenc 
6. Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion 
and plea agreement and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party 
has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to 
a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, 
the same must be approve by the court. If recommendations as 
to sentence are to be made to the court, you are informed that 
any such recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
(See reverse side) 
NCFT^ GuilTTY PLEA:" If'you GULCM; a not guilty pka, the court will set a 
trial date. AT the"f il: 
1. You have the right to appear and defend in person or by counsel. 
2. You must be present unless you consent in writing to a trial in* 
your absence. 
3. If you voluntarily absent yourself, the trial may proceed with-
out you, and you may be found guilty and a verdict and sentence 
may be imposed in your absence. 
4 . The trial shall be without a jury unless you make a written 
demand, which must be received by the court at least five (5) 
days prior to trial. (Excluding intermediate Saturdays, Sund-
days and legaL holidays) 
5. The case may proceed without a formal information (Complaint) 
being filed If you consent in writing that the citation con-
stitute the formal charges upon which the trial may proceed. 
FORFEITURE OF BAIL: With the court's approval, you may voluntarily for-
feit bail without appearance or after having posted bail, such voluntary 
forfeiture shall be entered as a conviction and treated the same as if 
you pleaded guilty. 
PLEA NEGOTIATIONS - CONTINUANCES: All plea negotiations with the pro-
secutor or requests for a continuance must be presented to the court at 
least two (2) days prior to the trial date. Thereafter, no plea to a 
lesser offense or continuance will be allowed by the court except for 
good cause shown. 
Your case will be prosecuted by the GrantsviLIe City Attorney, Mr, 
Ronald Elton, Tooele County Courthouse, 47 South Main Street, Tooele, 
Utah 84074. Telephone number 802-9120. You or your attorney may^ 
contact that office.for information concerning the charge(s) or trial. 
I have read the foregoing and understand the procedures of the court and 
rights as stated. 
Dated this / day of 5 >2p1'<?r?l ^ <:-;r* 19 J6/. 
